Reading the World through the Skin and Ears: A New Perspective on Sensory Substitution by Ophelia Deroy & Malika Auvray
HYPOTHESIS ANDTHEORY ARTICLE
published: 07 November 2012
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00457
Reading the world through the skin and ears: a new
perspective on sensory substitution
Ophelia Deroy 1* and Malika Auvray 2
1 Center for the Study of the Senses, Institute of Philosophy, University of London, London, UK
2 Laboratoire d’Informatique pour la Mecanique et les Sciences de l’Ingenieur, UPR 3251, CNRS, Paris, France
Edited by:
Dan Lloyd, Trinity College, USA
Reviewed by:
Bill Mace, Trinity College Connecticut,
USA
Julian Kiverstein, University of
Amsterdam, Netherlands
*Correspondence:
Ophelia Deroy , Centre for the Study
of the Senses, University of London,
Stewart House, 32, Russell Square,
LondonWC1E 7HU, UK.
e-mail: ophelia.deroy@sas.ac.uk
Sensory substitution devices aim at replacing or assisting one or several functions of a
deficient sensory modality by means of another sensory modality. Despite the numerous
studies and research programs devoted to their development and integration, sensory sub-
stitution devices have failed to live up to their goal of allowing one to “see with the skin”
(White et al., 1970) or to “see with the brain” (Bach-y-Rita et al., 2003). These somewhat
peremptory claims, as well as the research conducted so far, are based on an implicit per-
ceptual paradigm. Such perceptual assumption accepts the equivalence between using a
sensory substitution device and perceiving through a particular sensory modality. Our aim
is to provide an alternative model, which defines sensory substitution as being closer to
culturally implemented cognitive extensions of existing perceptual skills such as reading.
In this article, we will show why the analogy with reading provides a better explanation
of the actual findings, that is, both of the positive results achieved and of the limitations
noticed across the field of research on sensory substitution. The parallel with the most
recent two-route and interactive models of reading (e.g., Dehaene et al., 2005) generates
a radically new way of approaching these results, by stressing the dependence of integra-
tion on the existing perceptual-semantic route. In addition, the present perspective enables
us to generate innovative research questions and specific predictions which set the stage
for future work.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the 1960s, a series of devices have been developed to replace
or assist one or several functions of a deficient sensory modality
(e.g., vision) by means of another sensory modality (e.g., touch
or audition). These devices have been primarily developed to help
sensorially impaired people to navigate in their environment and
to recognize objects. Contrary to white canes which only rely on
the relevant initial properties of an object (in this case, mechani-
cal), these devices are based on a technologically guided conversion
of a certain type of stimuli, the perception of which is deficient,
into another type of stimuli, for which receptors are intact (Bach-
y-Rita et al., 1969). The first and probably most well known of
these sensory substitution devices has been designed to compen-
sate for visual deficits and convert visual images obtained through
a camera into patterns of tactile stimuli. The tactile-visual sensory
substitution (TVSS) designed by Bach-y-Rita in the 1960s was the
first device to launch the optimistic claim that blind individuals
could “see with the skin” (White et al., 1970, emphase are our
own). The very idea of sensory substitution has been extended
to the conversion of visual images into auditory signals and led
to the development of devices like the vOICe (for “Oh I see,” see
Meijer, 1992), the prosthesis for substitution of vision by audition
(PVSA, see Capelle et al., 1998), or theVibe (Hanneton et al., 2010).
The pressing challenges faced by researchers consist in finding the
best way to provide blind users with more and more accurate
information usually allowed by vision, such as color, shape, or
distance. A more fundamental question, though, is to understand
what underlies the acquisition of new identification skills that are
usually characteristic of a certain sensory modality by means of
another.
The initial idea of sensory substitution and the research con-
ducted since have encouraged the idea that trained users of visual-
to-tactile or visual-to-auditory conversion systems such as the
Tongue Display Unit, the vOICe, or the PVSA, recover a form
of vision – or at the very least, come close to acquire an ana-
log to sensory perception. Understood in a superficial way, such
claims need not be challenged: the capacity to respond in a dis-
criminative way to a certain kind of stimuli (or changes thereof)
can qualify as perceptual (see Garner et al., 1956) and the devices
advertised as sensory substitution certainly satisfy this require-
ment. Robust evidence shows that sensory substitution devices
provide their users with new abilities to detect and/or respond to
changes in their environments. However, this repeated, but hardly
ever examined equivalence between using a sensory substitution
device and perceiving through a canonical sensory modality has
turned into the dominant framework in which to interpret the data
obtained with those devices. Implications of sensory substitution
for understanding brain plasticity (Amedi et al., 2007; Bubic et al.,
2010; Ortiz et al., 2011), sensory individuation (Hurley and Noë,
2003; Auvray and Myin, 2009; O’Regan, 2011), or even synesthetic
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unions (Proulx and Stoerig, 2006; Proulx, 2010; Ward and Meijer,
2010) are all drawn with this assumption in mind, to the risk of
generating a confirmation bias in favor of the perceptual nature
of sensory substitution. But is another understanding of sensory
substitution possible, or even recommended?
Despite the numerous studies and research programs devoted
to their development and understanding (see Auvray and Myin,
2009, for a review), it is important to underscore that sensory
substitution devices have failed to live up to their goal of offer-
ing something close to the speed, accuracy, or discriminatory
responses observed in non-impaired individuals. Sensory substi-
tution devices are even further away from allowing their trained
users to see with the skin or ears: they do not offer something
somewhat similar to the rich visual experience that sighted peo-
ple have. But where do these limitations come from? Contrary to
the optimistic, but ungrounded idea that limitations result solely
from technological constraints and could be overcome in the near
future, we want to suggest that they might be intrinsic to sensory
substitution, and suggest that it will never come close to what per-
ception can be in other “natural” senses. The intrinsic limitations,
in our sense, are not restricted to a difference in the accuracy of
tactile or auditory processing that would be insufficient to code
for visual objects. Beyond these sensory differences, a fundamen-
tal problem comes from the learning of a new sensory translation
code. It is only by a better understanding of what learning to use
sensory substitution devices amounts to that we can understand
why they are not similar to perceiving in a typical modality.
The fact that a certain amount of familiarization and training
is necessary before being able to obtain basic skills with a sen-
sory substitution device (e.g., Kaczmarek and Haase, 2003; Auvray
et al., 2007a) could been seen as a straightforward objection to the
equivalence between sensory substitution and classical perception.
As we will discuss further below, traditional senses are generally
taken to be operational without training. However, what seems to
us most problematic for the perceptual equivalence relies less on
the necessity of training per se than on what training amounts to.
As we will detail in Section “Fifty Years of Evidence under the Per-
ceptual Assumption,” the past 50 years of research on training and
integration of sensory substitution devices has highlighted some
positive, but limited, evidence regarding the results and the nature
of training, as well as regarding the changes in subjective experi-
ence and neural organization that follows from longer-term use.
Despite being difficult to interpret, this set of evidence has been
increasingly considered as a confirmation of what we describe as a
perceptual assumption. It generates a confirmation bias as both the
experimental designs and the interpretations of the results are ori-
ented to reinforce the perceptual assumption. As argued at the end
of Section “Fifty Years of Evidence under the Perceptual Assump-
tion,” the perceptual interpretation of sensory substitution has
consequences for its theoretical and technological investigation,
all of which might benefit from its revision.
In Section “A New Model Based on the Analogy with Read-
ing,” we propose an alternative understanding of sensory sub-
stitution based on an analogy with the acquisition of reading
skills. Like reading, using sensory substitution devices requires
training and results in the progressive automatic decoding of
meaningful information. More specifically, in these two cases,
the information which was previously available and structured
through one sensory modality is artificially made available through
another sensory modality thanks to a code purposively designed to
preserve the relevant structure and dimensions. The aim is there-
fore to ensure recognition of the same objects across a change
of medium. Once understood with this goal in mind, it is eas-
ier to consider the skills obtained through sensory substitution as
crafted onto some existing route(s) which go from sensory stimu-
lation through to recognition. Instead of opening an autonomous
route to previously inaccessible information, sensory substitution
needs to be conceived as being a derived route which requires
that a first route and ways of accessing information already exist.
The analogy with dual-route models of reading then provides a
novel way to specify this proposal and understand the integra-
tion of sensory substitution devices. More importantly, besides
offering a novel perspective on the neurological, experiential and
behavioral effects of sensory substitution, the dual-route analogy
also generates novel predictions about training, and suggests new
directions for neurological investigation, as highlighted in Section
“Conclusion.”
FIFTY YEARS OF EVIDENCE UNDER THE PERCEPTUAL
ASSUMPTION
SCOPE OF THE ASSUMPTION
The various data about training, subjective changes and brain
plasticity that underlie the acquisition of new identification and
localization abilities have been unanimously interpreted through
a perceptual assumption. That is, as showing that using sensory
substitution devices is identical – if not in practice, at least in
principle – with the exercise of canonical sensory modalities. Start-
ing with White et al.’s (1970) claim that users of visual-to-tactile
substitution devices would be “seeing with the skin” to Bach-y-
Rita et al.’s (2003) revised idea that they would be “seeing with
the brain,” these optimistic claims have been echoed to the wider
audience including potential users of these devices: sensory substi-
tution devices have been advertised as “rewiring brains to see with
sound” and “restoring a form of sight to the blind” (Trivedi, 2010,
p. 42). The idea that sensory substitution devices could be analo-
gous to the visual system also finds an illustration in the domain
of technology, with the development of the PVSA, where a higher
resolution has been given to the center of the picture to replicate
what occurs in the fovea (Capelle et al., 1998).
Claims that technological supplementation could allow the user
to regain something similar to what perception normally is have
also been embraced in the discussion of the philosophical implica-
tions of sensory substitution. Many are keen to accept Heil’s idea
that “a person making intelligent use of a TVSS may be said to be
seeing (though perhaps only dimly) features of his environment”
(Heil, 1983, p. 16). Opposing these visual claims has mostly meant
objecting that using a device like the Tactile Vision Sensory Substi-
tution is more properly described as remaining as a form of tactile
perception (see Block, 2003).
These debates remain based on an implicit perceptual equiv-
alence which we suggest to identify as a perceptual assumption.
The influence of this perceptual assumption is visible in the fact
that researchers accept or target equivalences between using a sen-
sory substitution device and the exercise of a sensory modality. In
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other words the perceptual assumption considers that sensory sub-
stitution follows what occurs with canonical cases of perception
through one of the typical sensory modalities, that is as specialized
channels for transducing external information. As spelled out by
Grice (1962), perceiving through each of these specialized sensory
routes typically starts out with specific kinds of receptors being
stimulated by certain kinds of stimuli; the information is then
further processed (at least at an early stage) by dedicated sensory
mechanisms that finally deliver a representation of a certain kind
of object or properties or leads to specific responses (see Figure 1).
Even though perception of certain objects can be multisensory, it
is considered as constituted of two or more converging channels,
each of which can be specified independently through the four
criteria of stimuli, receptors, processes and outputs. When under-
stood as perceptual in this sense, sensory substitution is also seen
as fitting with these criteria. This explains the two main perspec-
tives that are currently present in the literature: some consider
sensory substitution devices from the point of view where they
lead to outputs that resemble those produced by vision, or where
they respond to visual stimuli, and think of it as sight or substitute
for it; others consider them from the point of view where they
recruit the receptors and early stages of processing of an existing
sense, and take it to be a sensory reorientation or extension of the
existing sense they exploit, for instance touch or audition. In both
cases, though, sensory substitution is forced into this single route
model used for other sensory channels.
The problem with the perceptual assumption is not only that it
delivers an unstable verdict regarding the exact sensory modality
to which a certain device should be ascribed. A more fundamental
problem than to decide whether using a device is closer to seeing
or hearing, is to examine whether the theorizing concerning these
devices should remain bound to the perceptual framework where,
canonically, perceiving means channeling information through a
single, dedicated route.
To us, the perceptual assumption appears to have led to a con-
firmation bias in the interpretation of the results. The results
of existing studies have been systematically filtered out of the
negative evidence, or data fitting less well with this assumption,
while the remaining evidence has been seen as confirming the
equivalence between using a sensory substitution device and per-
ceiving through one of the canonical senses. What’s more, the
experimental protocols themselves are built with the perceptual
assumption in mind which, in turn, constrains or limits the kind
of data that can be gathered. What we want to stress here is the ten-
sion between the perceptual model and parts of the data previously
mentioned.
A CONFIRMATION BIAS REGARDING PERFORMANCE AND TRAINING
What initiated and sustained the research interest for sensory
substitution in the first place is the fact that users of encoding
and decoding devices can perform tasks that they would not be
otherwise able to do given the general or temporary impairment
of one of their senses. In the case of visual-to-tactile devices, most
users are, within an hour or two, able to walk around and navi-
gate in their environment, and avoid obstacles. They also start to
locate objects in space (Jansson, 1983) and describe their shapes
(Sampaio et al., 2001; Kaczmarek and Haase, 2003). Ease and per-
formance improve with practice: the estimated amount of training
needed to reach a reasonable level of performance with the Tongue
Display Unit is approximately 8 h (Kaczmarek and Haase, 2003).
One interesting result obtained with these devices is that users
also become able to make perceptual judgments using perspec-
tive, such as the increasing angular size of approaching objects
(White et al., 1970; Bach-y-Rita, 1972); a somewhat surprising
result given the bi-dimensional nature of the stimulation. Another
interesting phenomenon, investigated under the name of “distal
attribution,” suggests a change in users’ subjective experience: they
no longer report feeling the stimulation on their skin, where it
occurs, but directly attribute the cause of the stimulation to a dis-
tant object (Bach-y-Rita et al., 1969; White et al., 1970; Bach-y-Rita
and Kercel, 2003). This said, this much quoted aspect of expe-
rience with visual-to-tactile sensory substitution device comes
FIGURE 1 |The analogy between reading and integrating
visual-to-auditory sensory substitution devices (like the
vOICe). Full arrows indicate new elements brought about by
training and new devices or artifact (coded letters in the case of
reading; decoding device in the case of sensory substitution
devices), dotted arrows indicate elements that pre-existed.
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mostly from subjective reports and awaits further psychophysical
testing.
Similar results have been obtained with visual-to-auditory
devices such as the vOICe and the PVSA. Trained users are able
to move around and to point at objects in their; to recognize
and categorize various objects (see Arno et al., 2001a,b; Renier
et al., 2005a; Auvray et al., 2007a; Proulx et al., 2008).What is strik-
ing with these two visual-to-auditory conversion systems is that
users can reach a proficient level of performance in a rather short
period of time, in the absence of a straightforward analogical code:
in other words, in the absence of a direct stimulus equivalence
as exists, for instance, between visual shapes and tactile shapes.
The fast integration of the previously described visual-to-tactile
devices can by contrast be attributed to the fact that they exploit
pre-existing or partly hard-wired crossmodal equivalence between
visual shapes and tactile shapes (see Streri, 2012, for a recent
review). This means that these crossmodally equivalent stimuli
are easily treated as conveying information about the very same
property. The translation code which consists of going from the
tactually sensed shapes caused by the device to the visual shapes
initially encoded is in this sense already known to sighted and
late-blind users, and probably benefits from its being hardwired
in congenially blind users, as suggested by the fast acquisition of
visuo-tactile equivalence in newly sighted individuals. If individ-
uals whose sight was restored are able to visually match an object
to a haptically sensed sample, this transfer is not immediate but
develops rapidly (see Held et al., 2011). Visual-to-auditory devices,
by contrast, make use of a largely arbitrary code. In the vOICe, for
instance, the scene is scanned from left to right, and higher freque-
nies codes for higher positions in the field, while loudness codes
for brightness1.
For visual-to-auditory devices, at least, learning or familiariza-
tion thus appears important. The main question here concerns the
kind of learning that is taking place. Although many users come
to wear the device knowing its function or being explicitly told
what the translation codes are, it is still not clear which strategy
is then used or how important or necessary sensorimotor feed-
back is to learning (e.g., Auvray et al., 2005; Siegle and Warren,
2010). The first thing to underscore here is a bias in calling the
performance perceptual. The skills gradually acquired by users
are always presented with respect to the perceptual framework:
the distal attribution reported with visual-to-tactile devices has
been understood as a switch from sensation in the substituting
modality to a new perception of an external object (Bach-y-Rita
and Kercel, 2003); The new localization abilities are said to come
within a “new perceptual space” (Auvray et al., 2005, p. 520). Last
but not least, the new identification skills acquired by the users
are interpreted as them gaining access to new perceptual qual-
ities, for instance, accessing shapes through audition (e.g., Heil,
1983).
The level of performance achieved through any of these sen-
sory substitution devices remains however inferior to any of the
1 It should be mentioned that some of these rules of translation might also be more
efficient because they are more “natural” than others, that is, because of existing
crossmodal correspondences between for instance auditory pitch and elevation in
space (see Marks, 1974, 1987; Spence and Deroy, 2012).
perceptual standards we know of. If one considers the standards
of the intact stimulated modality (audition or touch), sensory
substitution is lower in terms of speed and accuracy, and lower
in terms of automaticity and effort. The same is true if the cho-
sen standards are borrowed from the modality which is supposed
to be compensated. Noticeably, compared to visual perception,
the number of objects which can be jointly accessed or available
through sensory substitution devices seems to be much lower.
Contrary to vision, where people have been shown to be able
to track multiple objects (e.g., Pylyshyn, 2004), users of sensory
substitution devices have not been shown to be able to track
or identify multiple objects at once. Thinking then in terms of
resolution, the same limits apply: visual-to-tactile sensory substi-
tution devices might never reach the maximal resolution obtained
with vision. According to Loomis (2010; see also Loomis and
Klatzky, 2007), each sensory modality can be characterized by a
certain spatial bandwidth which corresponds to the total capac-
ity for conveying spatial information. The visual one is unique
in allowing a wide field of view and an access to fine spa-
tial details. By contrast, tactile processing has a lower spatial
bandwidth (e.g., Loomis, 1981). Such a large difference in spa-
tial resolution between the two senses involved means that it
might be impossible for touch to ever substitute for vision in
complex real-world situations, such as driving a car or playing
basketball.
Thinking that the use of a sensory substitution device comes
close to perceptual experience also misses the fact that certain
elements typically associated to sensory experiences are lacking.
Noticeably, the shapes perceived in one sensory modality are not
directly associated to pleasures or pains felt while perceiving the
same shape in another sensory modality (Lenay et al., 2003). It
should, however, be mentioned here that there are similar reports
of the absence of emotion and meaning felt by persons blind from
birth who recover sight following the removal of cataracts. There
are, at least at the beginning, no affective qualities associated to
colors and seeing faces is not associated to any emotional content
(Gregory, 2003).
What about training? The very necessity of training, which has
been in the background of the studies investigating performance,
is also forced into the perceptual framework, and this despite an
apparent tension with the common-sense notion of perception
(see Deroy and Auvray, in press). Although various perceptual
systems are considered to develop through time in infancy (John-
son and Vecera, 1996; see also Bremner et al., 2012, for a recent
take on this issue), this is not widely taken to require training; and
especially an explicit verbal training such as the one usually given
to obtain good results with sensory substitution devices. Inter-
estingly though, the necessity of training has not been seen as a
counter-argument to the perceptual model. Some have taken it as
a sign that the use of sensory substitution devices could be seen
as analogous to the acquisition of perceptual expertise through
an existing modality (see Heil, 2011). Others, stressing the role
played by active exploration during training with sensory substi-
tution devices, suggest that their progressive integration actually
confirms sensorimotor views of perception where sensory percep-
tion comes with the learning of new sensorimotor contingencies
(O’Regan and Noë, 2001; O’Regan, 2011). What matters here is
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not to adjudicate between these two versions, but to underscore
that each one manages to square the necessity of training with the
perceptual model.
Looking more closely at the contents of training though might
be important. Although active exploration is useful or even con-
stitutive, the identification of objects through sensory substitution
devices also integrates conceptual or semantic components which
are already present or known. For instance, the identification of
a 90˚ angle through the vOICe is not totally new. The capacity
to do so relies on existing knowledge of what a right angle is.
Thus, background knowledge does more than building up a form
of perceptual expertise in the substituting modality: the acquired
expertise is constituted by learning to judge patterns of stimula-
tion as falling under a certain concept or category. What happens
is that the judgments become progressively faster, more accurate
and more automatic. On important thing to underscore here is
that pre-existing cognitive elements play a direct role in the inte-
gration of sensory substitution devices: users identify novel objects
more rapidly when they belong to the same category as the objects
that were used during training (e.g., see Kim and Zatorre, 2008)
and they are slower for objects belonging to categories that were
not used during training. Patterns of generalization suggest that
semantic knowledge about objects categories, as much as actual
physical similarities perceived through the sensory substitution
device,plays an important role in enabling successful performance.
Interim summary
The perceptual perspective widely taken on sensory substitution
devices since their introduction has, overall, simplified the number
of terms used to analyze their use and integration. The under-
standing of sensory substitution has been framed merely in terms
of getting information from an intact, pre-existing receptor to the
emergence of new responses or representations, analogous to the
ones obtained through other known senses. However, several ele-
ments contradict the fact that sensory substitution behaves like a
classical sensory channeling of information. In terms of results or
outputs, sensory substitution is much more limited, for instance,
regarding the number and complexity of objects it gives access
to than any other form of perception, be it through vision, audi-
tion, or touch. The starting point of sensory substitution is also
more complex than just having intact receptors and early process-
ing: existing cognitive and semantic components are obviously
recruited in the process, and need to figure in the explanation of
both the positive and the limited scope of the results. The gener-
alization of training to new objects is also facilitated when these
objects remain in the same semantic category (Kim and Zatorre,
2008) and, to our knowledge, users have not been tested for totally
arbitrary or novel kinds of stimuli (or even impossible figures) for
which they lack pre-existing knowledge.
A CONFIRMATION BIAS REGARDING THE SUBJECTIVE AND
NEUROLOGICAL CHANGES ACCOMPANYING TRAINING AND NOVEL
PERFORMANCE
The evidence of novel performance both in localization and iden-
tification and the study of training are closely connected. They
have led researchers to pay closer attention to further changes
accompanying these progressive results, with the double objective
of trying to understand what underlies changes in performance
and to improve the efficiency of these devices.
The changes in subjective experience are perhaps one of the
most striking cases where evidence is forced into a perceptual
assumption. As was noted above, users of visual-to-tactile sen-
sory substitution devices do not just learn how to navigate in their
environment and to identify distant objects, they also report the
feeling of experiencing the distal object. This has been famously
described by Guarniero: “very soon after I had learned how to
scan, the sensations no longer felt as if they were on my back, and
I became less and less aware that vibrating pins were making con-
tact with my skin. By this time objects had come to have a top
and a bottom; a right side and a left; but no depth – they existed
in an ordered two dimensional space.” (Guarniero, 1974, p. 104).
It should be remembered that this specific subjective report came
from a philosophy student (not exactly a naïve experimental par-
ticipant) and thus, we would argue, needs further psychophysical
evidential support. Yet, this single statement has played a key role
in the discussion of the perceptual status of sensory substitution,
at least in philosophy (see Heil, 1983, 2003, p. 228, Heil, 2011, p.
288; Leon, 2011, p. 165; Peacocke, 1983, p. 15, Proulx and Stoerig,
2006). More recent studies have reported a correlation between
the reports of new phenomenological experiences of flashes in
trained late-blind users of visual-to-tactile sensory substitution
devices and the recruitment of the occipital cortex (Ortiz et al.,
2011), but such changes are not documented in congenitally blind
individuals. The visual character of these induced flashes or lights
thus remains to be ascertained in the case of individuals with no
residual vision.
Subjective changes have also been documented with visual-to-
auditory devices. Based on two subjective reports in late-blind
users, Ward and Meijer (2010) have suggested that training with
the vOICe could lead to the occurrence of visual images, com-
parable to the synesthetic experiences enjoyed by colored-hearing
synesthetes (see also Proulx, 2010, for an analogous claim). How-
ever, the evidence remains fragile, and compatible with the resur-
gence of color or texture memories for familiar objects, rather than
with the emergence of what Proulx (2010) calls a “synthetic synes-
thesia.” Looking for subjective changes, and trying to see whether
they become visual is strongly oriented by a perceptual assump-
tion, and plays a major role in the question that philosophers have
been eager to address, i.e., to what kind of perception the use of
sensory substitution device belongs. The nature of the experience
is supposed to help determining whether this perception remains
in the substituting modality, be it auditory (e.g., with the Voice)
or tactile (e.g., with the TVSS, see Humphrey, 1992; Keeley, 2002;
Block, 2003; Prinz, 2006) or goes to the substituted modality (e.g.,
vision for both the vOICe and the TVSS; see Cole, 1990; Dennett,
1991; O’Regan and Noë, 2001; Hurley and Noë, 2003).
Whether we could obtain a determinate answer regarding the
phenomenology of trained users of sensory substitution devices
is, however, questionable. First, the answer to this question relies
heavily on philosophical theories of what “auditory,” “visual,” or
other modal signatures are (i.e., what philosophers call kinds of
phenomenal character or experiences). Turning, then, to the actual
data, the answers provided by users are far from clear. In one
of the rare studies dealing with the issue, blindfolded sighted
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participants were asked to compare the subjective experience of
using the visual-to-auditory device the vOICe to other kinds of
sensory experiences (Auvray et al., 2007a). For many participants,
the modal characteristic varied with the task (being more often
visual for localization, and auditory for identification). Some par-
ticipants even considered the experience to be like an unusual
modality – such as having a sonar sense. The results from subjective
questionnaires certainly need to be handled with care, especially as
the very fact of raising the question can bias participants in trying
to guess what the experimenter expects. A minimal conclusion is
that the experience of using a sensory substitution device remains
endowed with a characteristic feeling and that the experience can
feel relevantly different from the experiences that one usually has
in the modality stimulated with the device (touch or audition),
while making it quite often comparable (but not similar to) pre-
vious experiences in the visual modality (see also Kupers et al.,
2011).
Besides these subjective changes, more robust data on the use
of sensory substitution devices come from the documentation of
neurological changes. The most investigated change concerns the
increased activation in the visual cortex after practice with visual-
to-auditory sensory substitution devices (De Volder et al., 1999;
Arno et al., 2001a; Renier et al., 2005b; Collignon et al., 2007) and
after practice with visual-to-tactile sensory substitution devices
(Ptito and Kupers, 2005; Ptito et al., 2005). The neural plasticity in
sensory substitution has been here seen as being of wider interest
to the study of neural plasticity following sensory deprivation or
impairment (e.g., Collignon et al., 2009).
Some connections between the subjective and neurological
changes can be tempting to make, and start to emerge, for instance,
with the hypothesis that long-term users of the vOICe could both
be subject to neurological reorganization in the occipital cortex
(e.g., Ortiz et al., 2011, and have visual experiences of colors or
textures (Ward and Meijer, 2010). However, such claims should
be taken with caution, given the presence of conflicting evidence
obtained with visual-to-tactile devices. In particular, Kupers et al.
(2006) used TMS on V1 of blind and sighted participants before
and after training with the Tongue Display Unit. Before train-
ing, no subjective tactile sensations were reported. After training,
some of the blind participants reported tactile sensations that were
referred to the tongue (three out of eight early blind and one out
of five late-blind participants). The author concluded that stimu-
lation of the visual areas induces tactile but not visual sensations in
trained blind users of the Tongue Display Unit. In other words, the
recruitment of V1 does not necessarily mean that the associated
subjective experience is visual. Whatever the answers to this prob-
lem, these debates still revolves around comparing using sensory
substitution device and perceiving in a canonical sensory modality.
Changes beyond primary sensory areas are now being docu-
mented. Amedi et al.’s (2007) study, for instance, revealed that
blind and sighted expert users of the vOICe show specific acti-
vation in the latero-occipital tactile-visual area (LOtv) when rec-
ognizing objects through the shape information conveyed by the
vOICe soundscapes. This does not occur when they are merely
associating soundscapes to objects or recognizing objects by their
typical sounds. The LOtv, which is a locus of multisensory con-
vergence, is usually activated both by the visual and the tactile
exploration of objects. Although there are good reasons to see
this as a perceptual reorganization, this study suggests that some
more complex reorganizations than strictly sensory ones are taking
place, having to do with later or supra-modal (in this case, shape)
recognition; rather than necessarily with primary sensory process-
ing. Moreover, as reviewed in Bubic et al. (2010) and Ortiz et al.
(2011), finer differences might also exist between the late blind,
the early blind, and sighted users of sensory substitution devices
in the recruitment of occipital areas. Noticeably, it is not yet clear
that activation in the occipital cortex reflects genuine bottom-up
activation for tactile or auditory stimulation, consistent with what
occurs in sensory perception, rather than top-down visual imagery
mechanisms (at least in late blind and sighted individuals, see
Poirier et al., 2007a,b; Tal and Amedi, 2009).
Interim summary
The perceptual assumption dominates the interpretation of the
results and orientates most of the research programs. Techni-
cal improvements and training are made with this perceptual
assumption in mind, leaving the limited success of sensory substi-
tution devices among blind individuals unexplained, or a matter
of prophetic improvement. Many scientists postulate that the lim-
ited results obtained with sensory substitution devices are only
transient and that the gap with sensory perception can be bridged
through further technological development or training. As yet,
no good arguments have been offered to support this prediction,
whereas the robustness of the negative evidence as well as the
limited success of the publicly advertised “substitution” devices
among blind users speak against the idea that sensory substitution
devices will really deliver on this perceptual promise. As we have
shown, the perceptual assumption is largely biased and leads one
to overlook some important features of the use and integration
of sensory substitution device. It has led to premature, and irre-
solvable debates regarding the analogy with synesthetic rewiring
of the senses (Proulx, 2010; Ward and Meijer, 2010), or with visual
perception (e.g., Bach-y-Rita and Kercel, 2003; Hurley and Noë,
2003). A better model is needed, that can take all of the evidence
into account in a more comprehensive and potentially fruitful way.
A NEWMODEL BASED ON THE ANALOGY WITH READING
The previous review opens an obvious challenge: how can we
make sense of the positive evidence collected within the perceptual
assumption, while acknowledging the limits and negative evidence
that has just been listed? Notice here that a failure to find an alter-
native model would, indirectly, validate the perceptual assumption
as being the best available model we have for thinking about sen-
sory substitution. We believe, however, that an alternative can be
found, which lifts the apparent contradiction between the canon-
ical and less canonical perceptual aspects of sensory substitution.
This alternative is to be found in an analogy with other acquired
skills and forms of automatic recognition – namely reading skills.
By analogy, we mean more than the similarity mentioned here
or there that converting sounds into visual or tactile signs acts
as a precursor to the more recent devices converting images into
sounds or tactile stimuli (Bach-y-Rita and Kercel, 2003, p. 541;
Eagleman, 2011). The deeper resemblance between the acquisi-
tion of reading skills and the integration of sensory substitution
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devices comes from the fact that, in both cases, the progressive
automatization of new identification skills consists in building
a second route, which presupposes the existence of a first sen-
sory route and parallels it. Instead of being like a dedicated route,
reading (typically, visual letters/word recognition) relies on speech
perception (classically, auditory speech perception) and delivers
access to the very same objects (word meaning). The necessity
of a pre-existing sensory route to a specific object, the fact that
these properties get conventionally re-coded and made available
to another sensory modality while not being, or becoming, com-
mon between the two is, as we want to stress, what also makes
the use and integration of sensory substitution devices sufficiently
different from crossmodal transfers such as the one which exists
between the visual and tactile identification of shapes (see Streri,
2012) or from other cases of sensory merging (Ernst and Bülthoff,
2004). Thinking about sensory substitution devices by analogy
with reading therefore goes away from the perceptual assump-
tion, where the devices resemble a canonical sensory modality, but
also from simple claims about the multisensory aspects of these
devices.
PARALLELS BETWEEN READING AND SENSORY SUBSTITUTION
Reading is classically defined as learning to access words through
vision instead of audition; or eventually, through touch instead
of audition in the case of Braille. Interestingly though, it is not
straightforwardly a way to gain new visual perceptions – as both
shapes and colors/contrast perceived in reading can already be
visually perceived. No new receptor is needed to access them.
At the same time, strictly speaking, reading brings about some-
thing new, which is the possibility to access through vision some
objects (words, sentences, and from there meanings) that were
only available through audition before. This does not mean that
reading adds access to auditory objects – as the shapes on the page
do not have properties detectable by audition. Reading does not
constitute an independent visual road substituting for the audi-
tory perception of spoken language. More importantly, it is not
an autonomous or dedicated perceptual system, and it is well
explained as the development of a second route, grafted onto the
auditory speech route, as popularized by the dual-route models of
reading (e.g., Coltheart and Rastle, 1994; see also Rastle, 2007 for
a review on current models of visual word recognition).
Writing systems have been designed to preserve the phone-
mic structures that are relevant to access semantic information. In
this sense, the code remains“auditorily phonemically”constrained
or governed. The acquisition of reading itself relies on existing
phonemic skills, not just on auditory perception, and consists in
mapping what one hears onto what one sees through the media-
tion of what one knows the later means. It is only as a result of
mapping the known written signs to known spoken words and
phonemes that readers can progressively entertain auditory repre-
sentation on the basis of visual words, and this even for unknown
or novel items.
Reading, then, is far from merely being a straightforward sen-
sory remapping. Even more specifically, the acquisition of reading
is accompanied by a change in subjective experience: written words
no longer appear as colored shapes but as meaningful graphemes
and words, which get easily and naturally associated to sounds
(i.e., either ones that one imaginatively hears, see Spence and
Deroy, in press for a discussion; or ones that one should articu-
late, see Galantucci et al., 2006 for a review). No such documented
change in experience, to our knowledge, has been observed as
a consequence of the progressive establishment of visuo-tactile
crossmodal transfer (see Held et al., 2011). This said, both reading
and other crossmodal transfers are internalized and become auto-
matic, in such a way that they no longer require attention or effort
from the trained reader.
Finally, learning to read induces crucial neurological changes
(noticeably in bilateral dorsal occipital areas associated with
higher-level visual processing, in superior temporal areas associ-
ated with phonological processing, and in the angular gyri as well
as in posterior middle temporal regions associated with seman-
tic processing, see Turkeltaub et al., 2003; Carreiras et al., 2009;
Dehaene et al., 2010), probably exploiting human neural plasticity
or recycling. New cultural inventions such as reading are closely
linked to “the constraints of our brain architecture” (Dehaene,
2009, p. 146) but they are most certainly revealing the extensive,
and partly culture-driven, character of brain plasticity (see Ansari,
2012, for a recent review) which other tools and devices certainly
exploit.
All these features, we argue, offer an analogy robust enough
to think about the results obtained through sensory substitu-
tion devices within a reading framework. The relevance of the
analogy with reading is more likely to be found with sensory
substitution devices that do not use an analogical format (e.g.,
visual-to-auditory systems such as the vOICe).
PUSHING THE ANALOGY FURTHER: DUAL-ROUTE MODELS OF READING
ACQUISITION AND SENSORY SUBSTITUTION
Going one step further, we want to argue that, by analogy with
dual-route models of reading, learning to use a sensory substitu-
tion device is no longer to be thought of as being merely a matter
of perceptual learning or adaptation, but as the building of a par-
allel access to cognitive and spatial representations that get grafted
onto some pre-existing perceptual-cognitive route (e.g., sounds
to objects and spatial representations in the case of the vOICe,
see Figure 2). This analogy encompasses the existing evidence and
allows further generalization or predictions which can promisingly
be put to test.
First and foremost, the dual-route model of integrating sen-
sory substitution devices is more illuminating with respect to the
existing results on training. Instead of trying to decide between
the cognitive or active aspects of the integration of sensory substi-
tution devices, or to adjudicate the exact importance of an explicit
teaching of rules (Auvray et al., 2007b; Siegle and Warren, 2010),
the dual-route model stresses the complementarity between these
two aspects. As in reading, a combination of practical active train-
ing and explicit teaching of codes is the most common method in
the area of sensory substitution, and the one for which most of the
results have been collected.
One objection here might come from the fact that explicit
teaching of the coding rules is not necessary for users to start show-
ing improved performance with a sensory substitution device. This
can nonetheless be accommodated within the analogy with read-
ing. In some cases of sensory substitution or reading, a minimal
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FIGURE 2 | Further analogies between reading and integration of visual-to-auditory sensory substitution devices. Full arrows indicate new elements
brought about by training and new devices or artifacts, dotted arrows indicate elements that pre-existed.
competence arises without training through the direct association
of a certain novel stimulus with a referent given through another
modality: as much as children can learn to associate the complex
visual form of a certain word with its phonology, and/or its ref-
erent – for instance, associate the visual look of the word “car”
to the sound (car) and from there to what they know about cars
– novice users of auditory-to-visual devices like the vOICe can
learn to associate a set of auditory patterns obtained through their
headphones to an object recognized by touch (and/or labeled by
the experimenter). Such an associative strategy though is unlikely
to generalize and predicts that same amount of effort/time will
be needed to learn every novel item. Another possibility, again
opened by the comparison with reading, is that the code can be (at
least to a certain extent) intuitively figured out, as it happens with
young children learning to read before any formal training.
A more specific prediction, here, is that learning without
explicit teaching will be more frequent or easy with visual-to-
tactile devices, at least in sighted and late-blind individuals, as they
rely on natural crossmodal equivalences between tactile and visual
shapes which do not need to be independently taught (Spence
and Deroy, 2012). By contrast, visual-to-auditory devices benefit
from less immediate transfers. This, however, does not mean that
their integration cannot be helped by pre-existing audio-visual
correspondences, for instance, between pitch and size, pitch and
brightness, or sounds and shapes. In fact, it has been shown that
most individuals tend to associate higher pitched sounds with
smaller or brighter visual targets from a very early age (see Marks,
1974, 1987; see Spence, 2011 for a review) and sounds of words
like “takete” or “maluma” to angular and round shapes, respec-
tively. Interestingly, these crossmodal correspondences have an
influence on a variety of tasks, including speeded detection tasks
and word learning. In a forced-choice task, two and a half year-
old children were asked by the experimenter to match two novel
words to two visual objects. The children tended to match rounder
shaped objects to words containing the vowels [a] or [u] like
bamu and angular shaped objects to words containing the vowels
[i]or [e] like kuh-tee (see Köhler’s, 1929, original study; Mau-
rer et al., 2006). Many other studies have subsequently demon-
strated similar effects across a variety of languages (see Imai et al.,
2008; Kantartzis et al., 2011; Yoshida, 2012). People also identify
novel objects more rapidly when crossmodal label-object map-
pings follow these crossmodal correspondences than when they
do not.
Within the domain of visual-to-auditory devices, there is a
likely correlation between the intuitive aspect of the code and the
amount of explicit training needed to achieve a reasonable level
of performance. Cutting these to a single dimension, the predic-
tion is that, in the absence of explicit teaching, the integration of
devices relying on a single and robust crossmodal correspondence
(for instance, only between high-pitched sounds and brightness)
will be easier than integrating a device that does not rely on such
intuitive correspondences. Predictions for the amount of explicit
training for devices using multiple dimensions like the vOICe are
harder to make even if they use intuitive correspondences, as we
lack good models of how crossmodal correspondences act in com-
bination (see Spence, 2011 for a review; see also Proulx, 2010, for
an analogous claim).
A THREE LEVEL MODEL
The benefits of the analogy with reading goes further than previous
claims and observations that using sensory substitution devices is,
in a sense that remain quite often under-specified, a form of sen-
sory cross-talk or rewiring (e.g., Amedi et al., 2007; Proulx, 2010)
and is akin to more widespread examples of multisensory process-
ing. Take, for instance, the recognition of shape, known as a case of
crossmodal transfer (see Streri, 2012, for a review): According to
most models, shape is processed first in a modal-specific way, that
is as a tactile or a visual shape, before these two can be encoded
in a common, amodal format, or translated into one another (see
Streri, 2012 for a review). As a result, visual and tactile perception
of shapes come to give access to what is considered as a single kind
of information, or property, which is neither specific to vision nor
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to touch. At first, it can seem appropriate to think about visual-to-
auditory sensory substitution in such a way, that is as building an
additional access (e.g., auditory) to shape. This model, however,
might overstate the similarities between the domain of sensory
substitution and the domain of crossmodal transfer in a way that
one is not obliged to accept, and which hide some specificities of
sensory substitution.
First, the fact that one can access information about shape
through audition does not necessarily mean that there is such
a thing as the perception of auditory shape, like there is a percep-
tion of visual shapes or tactile shapes. It seems like a stretch to say
that sensory substitution devices can change the proper objects of
audition, turning the perception of sounds into the perception of
shapes in space. Variations in shape/surface are reflected by vari-
ations in the resulting optic or tactile stimuli, and can be inferred
on that only basis. By contrast variations in shape/surface will not
result in a variation in the auditory signal, at least not one from
which that variation could normally be inferred. The only way to
constrain the inference is to learn an arbitrary translation from one
to the other. This is then more similar to the case of reading where
variations in the shapes of words or letters do not directly lead
to differences in sound. What happens though is that variations
in the shapes of words or letters can be translated into variations
in sounds, and from there to meaning. The arbitrariness of the
translation is sufficient to make the inference from seeing letters
to auditory properties of words and meanings special explaining
for instance why a change of code requires explicit teaching of new
rules of inference. Hearing through the vOICe gives cues to infer
properties of shapes/surfaces in a similarly code-dependent way.
Thinking about sensory substitution as a parallel to reading
skills helps introducing a distinction between two sub-levels of
sensory cross-talk or conversion, paralleling the inter-related lev-
els of separate letters, and whole word recognition. When using
sensory substitution devices, recognizing objects can rely on the
recognition of basic features (e.g., lines, shapes), global templates
(e.g., a specific sound pattern for bottles or plants), or a balance
between the two. This distinction might help to explain pat-
terns of generalization of training, and why training with new
objects is facilitated when either global templates or specific fea-
tures are similar to those that have been used previously (Kim and
Zatorre, 2008) – a point which is left unexplained in the perceptual
model.
Now whole objects or whole word recognition is also strongly
linked to pre-existing semantic representations of objects: for
instance, the knowledge of what plants and keys are, is used when
learning to recognize them with the vOICe. Similarly, learning to
identify, for instance, the words “too” and “two” is based on pre-
vious knowledge not only of the sounds but also of the semantic
values of the words. The same is true in the learning of non-
homophonous words, as whole word recognition, for instance,
at times dominates letter-by-letter recognition, a phenomenon
known as grapheme restoration. In reading acquisition and later
practice, it is not unusual to observe cases for which words dif-
fering only by one letter (orthographic neighbors, like “word” and
“ward,” for instance, see Williams et al., 2006) or words with a
letter-inversion (“jugde” instead of “judge,” see Acha and Perea,
2008) are confused in favor of the more contextually relevant or
frequent word. A prediction of the present model is that such
restoration effects might be found in sensory substitution as well,
with users missing or distorting the identification of low-level fea-
tures due to the recognition of global templates, and relatedly, of
the attribution or expectation of a certain meaning. Given this
prediction, a minor feature-inversion in the auditory conversion
of an object with the vOICe should remain undetected if the global
object template is familiar.
Going one step further, what the model suggests is that we
will learn as much concerning the integration of sensory substitu-
tion devices from their failures or limits than from their successes.
Many kinds of limits have been identified in reading and help
understand how this skill develops; for instance, limits on paral-
lel processing (see Reichle et al., 2009, for a review), or breaks in
transparency and in fluent processing generated by novel instances
of objects or changes in the coding, susceptibility to crowding (see
Whitney and Levi, 2011, for a review). Testing whether such limits
also exist in the case of sensory substitution devices opens-up an
interesting area of investigation. Access to distal objects remains
highly constrained by the limits set up by the learned code (paral-
lel to the failures of recognition for rotated letters). The learning
of sensory substitution devices will depend on the interactions
and interferences between these three steps on the new routes (i.e.,
semantic, whole object, and feature recognition).
In terms of results, we need to remain aware of the limits
of the analogy, coming from the disparity between the objects
at stake, which are linguistic in one case and material in the
other. However, the model of an inter-dependent acquisition,
increased automaticity and autonomy of new sensory templates
exhibited in reading skills parallels the features of integration
and use of sensory substitution devices. In both cases, the new
patterns of invariance across sensory stimulation are helped by
different levels of inter-sensory conversions. These new patterns
of invariance collaborate in successful, direct recognition of the
relevant information, which remains nonetheless fragile and sub-
ject to regression, to mere noise in the case of sensory substitution
device users, and mere shapes in the case of (novice) readers.
Within the perceptual assumption, these limits or regressions can
only be said to correlate with task difficulty and users’ experi-
ence. This remains descriptive and not explanatory. By contrast,
the analogy with reading helps in shaping testable predictions
and in looking for specific patterns of regression and acquisi-
tion. It is for instance well known that novice readers regress to
letter-by-letter reading for long or unknown words and more gen-
erally adopt coarser and more associative strategies than trained
readers (see Dehaene, 2009, for a review). An interesting paral-
lel could be made here with sensory substitution devices, looking
at whether users go back to a feature-by-feature deciphering of
the scene when presented with new or more complex objects or
adopt a coarser global associative strategy at the beginning of the
training. In other terms, such investigation should focus on the
errors made by users of sensory substitution devices during their
training, and try to explain why they commit more or specific
types of errors in certain cases, and not in others. Again, as it
is the case with reading, we might learn about the positive skills
acquired by looking at errors or difficulties encountered during
acquisition.
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Besides the fundamental scientific interest, this investigation
is likely to help with designing better devices. Another point
worth mentioning here is that, if the analogy with reading
holds, the design itself will be limited by the very limits of our
capacities for cognitive reorganization, as witnessed in reading:
access will remain limited in terms of the number of objects
for users of sensory substitution devices as with graphemes for
readers.
CONSEQUENCES OF THE READING ANALOGY
Theoretically speaking, it might at first seem that our analogy
cancels the exciting challenges raised by the widely assumed per-
ceptual interpretation of sensory substitution, noticeably by stop-
ping the quest for the right kind of sensory modality to ascribe
them to. Other challenges are however introduced by the reading
analogy.
The most straightforward one is the need to look for a better
name for these devices. Conceiving of these devices as providing
their users with a skill akin to reading makes the very term of
“sensory substitution” irrelevant, and even terms like “compensa-
tion” might not be appropriate. This said, there might be historical
and methodological reasons to keep the name sensory substitu-
tion devices, as the one on which everyone has agreed for a long
time.
More fundamentally, the comparison with reading shows that
learning to use a sensory substitution device should not be thought
of as occurring “horizontally”: Sensory substitution devices do
not have to fit within the concept of a sense even if they appar-
ently serve similar functions (i.e., identification and localization).
On the contrary, they help introducing the notion of vertical
integration: they do not fit among the sensory modalities but also
they require the existence of (some of) these modalities. Sensory
substitution devices are built up from existing sensory modal-
ities both in terms of the receptors that they use, and of the
invented code they rely on. In addition, this relation is not of
emergence (i.e., as if a new sense or skill appeared that was not
reducible to the previous ones) but of inter-dependence or craft-
ing (i.e., the new skill starts from an existing one, and although
it becomes progressively more independent, it does not become
totally detached from the initial elements). Where do these “ver-
tically integrated” skills fit in our models of the mind? Here, we
need to point at a relatively poor philosophical literature when
it comes to thinking about the status of semi-perceptual, semi-
cognitive skills such as reading, and their relation to more canon-
ical forms of perception. Many philosophical questions remain
open. Does reading simply consist in seeing letters? What is then
the difference between seeing a letter and seeing a shape? If
reading is an access to meaningful words, what is the difference
between words and “common sensibles” for instance, shared both
by audition, vision, and eventually touch? Addressing these ques-
tions for reading, we contend, is not only intrinsically important
but likely to offer a parallel to build better models of sensory
substitution.
Last but not least, in recent years, sensory substitution has
been increasingly seen as a window onto neurological plasticity
following sensory loss. It has allowed researchers to study the
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blind users after an extended training with tactile or auditory
devices (Ptito et al., 2005; Amedi et al., 2007; Collignon et al.,
2007; Kupers et al., 2010; Ortiz et al., 2011). Evidence obtained
with sensory substitution devices is here crucial to think about
sensory rehabilitation in general (Merabet and Pascual-Leone,
2010, for a review), but the present proposal suggests that it
should be studied under the heading of culturally driven plas-
ticity (Ansari, 2012) integrating top-down influences rather than
naturally occurring rewiring or crossmodal transfers as the one
occurring between tactile and visual shapes for instance or in
developmental synesthesia (Ward and Meijer, 2010). The effort
to understand sensory substitution should be tied to the new
challenges of understanding the neurological changes induced by
literacy or numeracy, regarding for instance the role of top-down
influences, or the effects of learning on the initial levels of sensory
processing.
CONCLUSION
The use and integration of sensory substitution devices are inves-
tigated within a perceptual paradigm that constrains actual inves-
tigation and biases the interpretation of the results regarding
training, subjective, and neurological changes. A more compre-
hensive perspective is needed to take into account overlooked
evidence, which is offered by an analogy with the development
of reading skills (see Table 1). In brief, these devices provide a
powerful means to “read” the world, but not to “see” it – which
incidentally questions the relevance of the very idea of “sensory
substitution.”
Learning to use sensory substitution devices must be redefined
as an inter-dependent acquisition, progressive automatization, and
relative autonomy of new translation templates: letters and words
act as newly visually coded speech sounds; in the same way audi-
tory templates in sensory substitution devices like the vOICe act
as newly auditorily coded visual shapes and objects. New patterns
of invariance across sensory stimulation are helped by different
levels of inter-sensory conversions. The overall account generates
new ways of investigating the integration and use of sensory sub-
stitution devices, as well as their technological future, resulting in
several recommendations.
The first, and more general one is methodological. Instead of
trying to improve sensory substitution devices within the percep-
tual assumption, we should accept that their use and integration
will remain limited and study what their limits are, and where they
come from. More specifically, we would suggest that these limita-
tions are likely to vary depending on groups of participants: like
for reading skills, the degree of perceptual accuracy, as well other
differences in attention or cognitive competences, will isolate dif-
ferent groups of participants for both neurological and behavioral
studies. A more discriminated view will deliver more fine grained
conclusions about how various components articulate and explain
the relative success of sensory substitution devices.
A second important adjustment, theoretical this time, is to real-
ize that the study of sensory substitution devices does not shed
light on perception stricto sensu. Noticeably, these studies will be
of no relevance in the debates regarding the definition or individ-
uation of the senses and will not constitute canonical examples of
what it is to perceive in a certain sensory modality. Rather, sensory
substitution devices open-up questions about what we have called
vertical faculties: some “hybrid capacities” might be built along
sensory transducers faculties by exploiting their specific outputs,
and relying on the structural features of the latter, and building
new crossmodal correspondences or translations between them.
What sensory substitution shows therefore is not strictly sensory
plasticity nor perceptual emergence or extension, but mostly cul-
turally driven multisensory plasticity, that is the margin left for
exploiting and redirecting the existing rules of multisensory and
crossmodal interactions to build new cognitive routes between
existing components.
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